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I.  INTRODUCTION 
The issues revolving around the retention and continued testing of 
human donative materials, such as saliva, tissues, and blood are a 
longstanding bioethical concern.  Whether considering the unauthorized 
and continued experimentation on Henrietta Lack’s cancer cells1 or the 
events that led to the capture of the Golden State Killer,2 an important 
question remains: how can lawmakers ensure the protection of 
biotechnology consumers?  With the rapid expansion of genetic 
technology, individuals can easily crack the code of their DNA, but this 
information comes at a cost.  DNA is a powerful identifier and unique to 
each individual.3  This comment will explore the shortcomings of privacy 
protections in genetic testing.  Specifically, this comment will consider 
whether a consumer is afforded greater privacy protection depending on 
whether the individual chooses genetic analysis in a hospital or Direct to 
Consumer (“DTC”) analytical services.4  As technology and its access 
improve, regulation of genetic testing is necessary to protect the privacy of 
those considering genetic testing.  Privacy laws must be enacted to 
 
 1  See Rebecca Skloot, THE IMMORTAL LIFE OF HENRIETTA LACKS 57 (New York: 
Crown Publishers, 2010) (describing the collection and propagation of cervical cancer cells 
collected without Henrietta Lacks knowledge or consent. The cell line developed from her 
sample has become the oldest and most commonly used cell line in biological research). 
 2  The Golden State Killer—a rapist and murderer—was captured after 44 years of 
police investigation. The capture was made possible through the use of crime scene DNA 
and relatives matched through genetic databases. See Justin Jouvenal, To Find Alleged 
Golden State Killer Investigators First Found His Great-Great-Great-Grandparents, WASH. 
POST, (Apr. 30, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/public-safety/to-find-alleged-
golden-state-killer-investigators-first-found-his-great-great-great-
grandparents/2018/04/30/3c865fe7-dfcc-4a0e-b6b2-
0bec548d501f_story.html?noredirect=on&utm_term=.48abb8e17547. 
 3  See supra notes 27-30 (explaining identical twins are an exception and share 
identical DNA). 
 4  While this note will consider the merits of choosing one service over another, 
consideration of test accuracy is outside the scope of this comment.   
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specifically address genetic information due to DNA’s unique, identifiable 
nature. 
II. BACKGROUND 
Individuals may choose to analyze their DNA for a variety of reasons.  
This section will consider common reasons that consumers choose genetic 
analysis.  This section will then overview the process of DNA analysis and 
explain why genetic privacy is concerning. 
A. Why do individuals test their DNA? 
When Watson and Crick discovered the double-helix of 
deoxyribonucleic acid (“DNA”), they most likely did not imagine a world 
in which consumers could unravel their personal DNA codes so easily.5  
Since Watson and Crick’s landmark discovery, advancements in DNA 
science unlocked tools through which scientists can aid in the formulation 
of medical treatment plans for individuals through DNA analysis.6  For 
example, DNA analysis has revolutionized how doctors treat breast 
cancer.7  After careful analysis of an individual’s DNA, a doctor can 
recommend different treatments based on the genetic risk of breast cancer 
development or recurrence simply from the results of the analysis.8  
Another example is the use of DNA DTC health tests where consumers 
learn about potential genetic health risks or the risk of passing a genetically 
heritable trait to an offspring through companies like 23andMe.9 
DNA analysis has further led to ground-breaking testing outside of 
healthcare, such as connecting long-lost relatives to one another.10  
Consumers who wish to connect to lost relatives can do so by analyzing 
 
 5  Office of NIH History, Identifying DNA, NAT’L INST. OF HEALTH, 
https://history.nih.gov/exhibits/nirenberg/HS2_DNA.htm (last visited Nov. 14, 2019). 
 6  Id. 
 7  See generally Karen Lisa Smith, BRCA Mutation Testing in Determining Breast 
Cancer Therapy, CANCER J., (2011), 
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3240813 (explaining that the BRCA gene is 
commonly tested in both those who have been previously diagnosed with breast cancer and 
those who have family histories of BRCA related cancers. After genetic screening, a doctor 
may recommend prophylactic treatments, such as mastectomies.). 
 8  Id.  
 9  National Human Genome Research Inst., Genetic Testing FAQ, NAT’L INST. OF 
HEALTH, https://www.genome.gov/19516567/faq-about-genetic-testing/ (last visited Nov. 
14, 2019); Getting Started, 23ANDME, https://medical.23andme.com/dna-kits/#clia (last 
visited Nov. 14, 2019) (23andMe is a company that provides genetic testing for purposes of 
health, wellness, and research. The website sells test kits to consumers that are interested in 
DNA analysis).  
 10  See Finding Biological Family, ANCESTRY, https://support.ancestry.com/s/article/US-
AncestryDNA-for-Adoptees-Search-Strategies (last visited Nov. 14, 2019) (showing how 
adopted children may use the service to find their biological parents). 
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their DNA using services offered by companies with large genetic 
databases. 11 These databases have the ability to connect consumers with 
unknown or lost relatives through shared DNA.12 While some individuals 
utilize these services out of pure curiosity, others use these tools to connect 
with unknown family members.13  Many companies provide both relative 
matching and analytical services; however, some companies, like 
GEDmatch.com only offer post-analysis services.14  This platform allows 
consumers to upload test results from another company and search for 
genetic relatives in the database.15 
B. What happens when an Individual’s DNA is analyzed? 
When an individual provides a sample for genetic testing—most often 
a saliva sample—that sample is sent to a laboratory for analysis.  Different 
types of laboratory analyses can be conducted, depending on the service 
provider’s aim.16  Most methods of genetic analysis used by the services 
described in this comment are classified as molecular analysis, which refers 
to the process of tagging individual DNA building blocks to assess 
abnormalities.17  This molecular process involves sequencing all or part of 
a DNA.18  For example, 23andMe offers to test for certain variations in the 
BRCA gene.19  Because the variants of BRCA are known, researchers can 
test for the presence or absence of a specific mutation.20  Ancestry tests 
 
 11  Id. 
 12  Id. 
 13  Id. 
 14  GEDmatch.com is a database that provides genealogical tools for researchers and 
amateurs alike. Most tools on GEDmatch.com are free. GEDMATCH, 
https://www.gedmatch.com (last visited Nov. 14, 2019).  
 15  See Sarah Zhang, How a Tiny Website Became the Police’s Go-To Genealogy 
Database, THE ATLANTIC, (June 1, 2018), 
https://www.theatlantic.com/science/archive/2018/06/gedmatch-police-genealogy-
database/561695/. 
 16  Amelia Chappelle et al., Understanding Genetics: A New York, Mid-Atlantic Guide 
for Patients and Health Professionals, GENETIC ALLIANCE, July 8, 2009, at 78 (Cytogenic 
tests look at abnormalities such as translocations and deletions of chromosomes. 
Biochemical tests look to analyze the efficacy of metabolic pathways, seeking to determine 
if abnormalities in protein outputs are present when cells read genetic material.) 
 17  Id. 
 18  Id.  
 19  Do You Speak BRCA?, 23ANDME, https://www.23andme.com/brca// (last visited 
Nov. 14, 2019); National Cancer Institute, BRCA Mutations: Cancer Risk and Genetic 
Testing, NAT’L INST. OF HEALTH, https://www.cancer.gov/about-cancer/causes-
prevention/genetics/brca-fact-sheet#q1 (last visited Nov. 14, 2019) (explaining that BRCA1 
and BRCA2 are tumor suppressor genes. Mutation in one of these genes indicates a 
heightened risk of developing breast or ovarian cancers).  
 20  Amelia Chappelle et al., Understanding Genetics, supra note 20, at 78.  
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similarly employ molecular analysis.21  In the process of analyzing the 
samples, researchers target sequences of interest and digitize the code.22  
Through this process, researchers can analyze the pattern of Guanine, 
Thymine, Cytosine, and Adenine proteins.23  Researchers then take the 
digitized samples and input them into mass databases to compare various 
genetic data samples.24 
C. Why should we care about genetic privacy? 
First, DNA is the building block of human life.25  DNA provides 
instructions to our cells to grow, reproduce, and function.26  While human 
species share roughly 99% of their genome, an individual’s genome is 
unique.27  Not only is DNA unique, but it is also heritable.28  On 
23andMe’s website, the company explains that siblings (other than 
identical twins or higher-order multiple births) will share 50% of their 
DNA and third cousins will share less than 1% of their DNA 29; yet genetic 
analysis can nonetheless recognize third cousins with accuracy.30 
Second, the robust size of most genetic databases is sufficient to 
match relatives and therefore identify a DNA sample. There are currently 
many genetic databases holding more than five million samples.31  
 
 21  Frequently Asked Questions, ANCESTRYDNA, 
https://www.ancestry.com/dna/en/legal/us/faq#about-3 (last visited Sept. 28, 2019); Rafi 
Letzter, How Do DNA Ancestry Tests Really Work?, LIVE SCIENCE, (June 4, 2018), 
https://www.livescience.com/62690-how-dna-ancestry-23andme-tests-work.html 
(explaining Ancestry DNA tests 700,000 locations on a DNA strand).  
 22  Letzter, supra note 21. 
 23  Id. 
 24  Id. 
 25  See What is DNA?, Genetics Home Reference: Help Me Understand Genetics, NAT’L 
INST. OF HEALTH (October 29, 2019) https://ghr.nlm.nih.gov/primer/basics/dna. 
 26  Letzter, supra note 21. 
 27  Letzter, supra note 21; see also What is in your DNA Fingerprint?, YOUR GENOME, 
(last updated Jun. 2, 2016) https://www.yourgenome.org/facts/what-is-a-dna-fingerprint 
(explaining 99% shared DNA is true except in the case of identical twins, that share the 
same DNA). 
 28  See District of Columbia Department of Health, Understanding Genetics: A District 
of Columbia Guide for Patients and Health Professionals, GENETIC ALLIANCE, February 17, 
2010, at 6.  
 29  DNA Relatives: The Basics, 23ANDME, https://customercare.23andme.com/hc/en-
us/articles/212170668-Average-percent-DNA-shared-between-relatives (last visited Nov. 
14, 2019) (stating that relationships such as grandparents, aunts, uncles, and half-siblings 
will all share about 25% of DNA.). 
 30  Id.; see also DNA Relatives, supra note 29.  
 31  Leah Larkin, Database Sizes—September 2018 Update, THE DNA GEEK, (Sep. 3, 
2018), http://thednageek.com/database-sizes-september-2018-update/ (demonstrating that 
approximate sample sizes among major testing companies as follows: AncestryDNA over 
ten million, 23andME over five million, and GEDMatch over one million.). 
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According to research by Elrich, any genetic database with roughly three 
million entries will likely provide a genetically matched cousin to any 
individual of northern European descent.32 Specifically, there is a 99% 
chance of a third cousin match and a 65% chance of a second cousin match 
in most databases.33 Both AncestryDNA and 23andMe boast a database of 
over five million samples, meeting this threshold.34 
The practical implication of a large DNA database is that even if the 
identity of a DNA sample is unknown, by searching for DNA relatives, an 
individual’s identity can be discovered.  For example, police officers have 
the potential to collect crime scene DNA and discover the individual’s 
identity, based upon genetic relatives.35  Recently, law enforcement in 
California used this method to identify the Golden State Killer.36  Officials 
ran the collected crime scene DNA through a fake profile on 
GEDmatch.com, where it was matched the sample to the Golden State 
Killer’s brother.37  While easily finding DNA matches for dangerous 
criminals is a positive advancement, these databases can be used to detect 
the identities of more than just those who have committed serious crimes, 
potentially invading an individual’s privacy.38  Even if the size of a genetic 
database is insufficient to match an individual’s relative, the database can 
be used in conjunction with other readily accessible public records 
containing demographic information to identify an individual without their 
consent or knowledge.39 
The Elrich study, mentioned above, suggests that even DNA 
deposited through a health care professional (“HCP”), which must be de-
identified pursuant to Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act 
of 1996 (“HIPAA”), could be re-identified through a database.40  Publicly 
 
 32  See Yevin Elrich et al., Identity inference of genomic data using long-range familial 
searches, SCIENCE, Oct. 2018, at 2 (describing that authors predict that the size of third-
party websites such as GEDMatch will expand to this size in the near future.).  
 33  Id. 
 34  See Larkin, supra note 31; Id.  
 35  See e.g., Jamie Durcharme, A DNA Site Helped Authorities Crack the Golden State 
Killer Case. Here’s What You Should Know About Your Genetic Data Privacy, TIME, (Apr. 
27, 2018), http://time.com/5257474/golden-state-killer-genetic-privacy-concerns/. 
 36  Id.; see also Matthias Gafini, Here’s the ‘open-source’ genealogy DNA website that 
helped crack the Golden State Killer case, THE MERCURY NEWS, (Apr. 26, 2019), 
https://www.mercurynews.com/2018/04/26/ancestry-23andme-deny-assisting-law-
enforcement-in-east-area-rapist-case//. 
 37  Durcharme, supra note 35; Gafini, supra note 36. 
 38  Gafini, supra note 36. 
 39  See Elrich et al., supra note 32, at 2. 
 40  Id. at 2-3; Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) of 1996, 
Pub. L. 104-191, 110 Stat. 1936, 2029 (codified as amended in 18 U.S.C., 26 U.S.C., 29 
U.S.C., & 42 U.S.C.); 
see generally 45 C.F.R.164 (authorized by 42 U.S.C.S. § 1302). 
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accessible databases like the 1000 Genomes Project41 provide public access 
to “de-identified” patient information such as raw genetic data and birth 
year of research participants.42  The study found that samples deposited 
through HCPs could be re-identified just as the investigator did in the 
Golden State Killer Case.43  To test the hypothesis, researchers began with 
known samples searching for ancestors in GEDmatch.44  The researchers 
eventually re-identified the sample.45  The researchers noted that, although 
medical research samples are collected through HIPAA protected entities 
and stripped of identifiable information, there remains a significant risk of 
exposure because DNA may be re-identified, rendering private information 
no longer private.46 
III. LAWS AND REGULATION GOVERNING PRIVACY OF GENETIC 
INFORMATION 
This section will consider current federal and state privacy laws that 
regulate genetic testing performed by either a healthcare provider or direct-
to-consumer genetic testing company. 
A. HIPAA 
The Privacy Rule was promulgated pursuant to the Health Insurance 
Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (“HIPAA”), which aims to 
protect Patient Health Information (“PHI”).47  The Privacy Rule applies to 
three types of entities and their business associates: health plans, health 
clearinghouses, and health care providers that transmit health information 
electronically.48  PHI is defined as information that is created or received 
by a covered entity that “relates to the past, present, or future physical or 
mental health [. . .] of an individual,” including care to an individual or the 
payment for health care.49  The Privacy Rule has four aims: (1) “[e]nsure 
the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of all electronic protected 
 
 41  The 1000 Genomes Project is an international research consortium formed for the 
goal of sequencing 1000 genomes and providing a greater understanding of genetic data. 
After sequencing over 1000 genomes, the consortium created an open-access database with 
the information. See generally, Olivier Devuyst, The 1000 Genomes Project: Welcome to a 
New World, J. OF INT’L SOC’Y FOR PERITONEAL DIALYSIS (Dec. 2015). 
 42  Elrich et al., supra note 32, at 2, 3. 
 43  Elrich et al., supra note 32, at 2, 3. 
 44  Elrich et al., supra note 32, at 2, 3. 
 45  Elrich et al., supra note 32, at 2, 3. 
 46  Elrich et al., supra note 32, at 2, 3. 
 47  See generally The Privacy Rule, 45 C.F.R. § 160 (2003) (authorized by 42 U.S.C.S. 
§ 1302 (2019)). 
 48  45 C.F.R. § 164.104. 
 49  45 C.F.R. § 160.103. 
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health information;” (2) protect from threats or hazards to PHI security; (3) 
“protect against any reasonably anticipated uses” of the PHI; and (4) ensure 
compliance with the privacy rule.50  In effect, the rule allows for disclosure, 
collection, and storage of identifiable health information subject to 
specified conditions, among other things. 
HIPAA only covers the identifiable information collected from 
patients of a covered entity.51  Health care providers include, but are not 
limited to, “a hospital, critical access hospital, skilled nursing facility [ . . .] 
or a fund.”52  Covered entities are also classified by the services provided. 
Medical services, defined in 42 U.S.C.S. § 1395x(s), include diagnostic 
services—but only those “furnished to an individual as an outpatient by a 
hospital or by others under arrangements with them made by a hospital” 
and “ordinarily furnished by such hospital (or by others under such 
arrangements) to its outpatients for the purpose of diagnostic study.”53  The 
rule covers diagnostic tests performed by a health care provider.54  DTC 
companies are not considered health care providers,55 and thus these 
companies are not required to comply with HIPAA. 
Under the Privacy Rule, genetic data that is stripped from the patient’s 
personal information (e.g., name and address) is considered de-identified 
information.56  Under HIPPA, when the genetic data is no longer connected 
to personally identifiable information, it may be shared freely, without 
express patient consent. 
B. Federal Trade Commission Oversight 
The Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”) aims to, among other things, 
protect individuals from deceptive advertising.57  Presently, the FTC’s 
scope is limited to ensuring truth in regulating commerce activities; 
however, the FTC’s scope may soon expand to include privacy 
regulation.58  The U.S. Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and 
 
 50  45 C.F.R. § 164.306. 
 51  See 45 C.F.R. § 160.102.  
 52  45 C.F.R. § 160.103; 42 U.S.C.S. § 1395x(u).  
 53  42 U.S.C.S. § 1395x(s)(2)(c).  
 54  See generally 45 C.F.R. § 160. 
 55  DTC companies provide this information without necessarily involving a health care 
provider. See What is direct to consumer genetic testing, NAT’L INST. OF HEALTH, 
https://ghr.nlm.nih.gov/primer/dtcgenetictesting/directtoconsumer (last visited Nov. 14, 
2019).  
 56  United States Dep’t of Health and Human Services, Health Information Privacy, 
(last updated Nov. 14, 2015), https://www.hhs.gov/hipaa/for-professionals/privacy/special-
topics/de-identification/index.html.  
 57  About the FTC, FED. TRADE COMM’N, https://www.ftc.gov/about-ftc (last visited 
Nov. 14, 2019).  
 58  See Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C.S. § 45(a)(1) (2019); Press Release, 
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Transportation held multiple hearings to discuss expanding data privacy 
regulation by the FTC.59  In opening remarks, Senator Thune stated the 
question surrounding data privacy “is no longer whether we need a federal 
law to protect consumers’ privacy.  The question is what shape it should 
take.”60  This action follows recent data breaches, as seen with the 
Equifax61 and Facebook’s Cambridge Analytica scandals.62  As of 2019, 
the Senate committee continues to evaluate a response to the privacy laws 
enacted by the State of California63 and the European Union.64  The 
European Union enacted the General Data Protection Regulation 
(“GDPR”), which is geared towards protecting the privacy of consumers’ 
information in this digital age, and classifies the privacy from unauthorized 
data processing as a fundamental right.65  The Senate committee has 
indicated that the FTC best serves the purpose of regulating privacy 
because of its role in consumer protection.66  The committee has not held 
further hearings on the topic since May 2019.67 
 
 
 
 
U.S. Senate Comm. on Commerce, Sci., & Transp., Committee Announces Second Data 
Privacy Hearing (Oct. 4, 2018) (on file at 
https://www.commerce.senate.gov/public/index.cfm/pressreleases?ID=2E7C60ED-9D88-
418B-B5E0-EE2C41941E8C). 
 59  Press Release, supra note 58; see also Consumer Data Privacy: Examining Lessons 
From the European Union’s General Data Protection Regulation and the California 
Consumer Privacy Act: Hearing Before the Senate Comm. on Commerce, Science, & 
Transp., Committee, 116th Cong. (Oct. 10, 2018) (on file at 
https://www.commerce.senate.gov/2018/10/consumer-data-privacy-examining-lessons-
from-the-european-union-s-general-data-protection-regulation-and-the-california-consumer-
privacy-act).  
 60  Press Release, supra note 58. 
 61  The Equifax Data Breach, FED. TRADE COMM’N, https://www.ftc.gov/equifax-data-
breach (last visited Sept. 28, 2019).  
 62  Kevin Granville, Facebook and Cambridge Analytica: What You Need to Know as 
Fallout Widens, THE NEW YORK TIMES, (March 19, 2018), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/19/technology/facebook-cambridge-analytica-
explained.html. 
 63  California Consumer Privacy Act of 2018, Cal. Civ. Code § 1798.100 (effective Jan. 
2020). 
 64  European Union General Data Protection Regulation (EU) 2016/679, https://eur-
lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:32016R0679&from=en. 
 65  Id.  
 66  Press Release, supra note 58.   
 67  U.S. Senate Comm. on Commerce, Science, & Transp., Committee, Consumer 
Perspectives: Policy Principles for a Federal Data Privacy Framework: Hearing Before the 
Senate Comm. on Commerce, Science, & Transp., Committee, 116th Cong. (May 1, 2019) 
(on file at https://www.commerce.senate.gov/public/index.cfm/hearings?ID=EC293594-
BD9A-4F07-9B7D-B9EFE65E7DC4) 
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The FTC is responsible for regulation of nonprescription medical 
device advertising.68  The FTC has actively regulated and challenged the 
advertising representations of DTC tests, including GeneLink, Inc. and 
Foru International Corporation.69  The FTC was concerned with the validity 
of their recommendations.70  The FTC ensures that a company will adhere 
to promises of privacy presented to consumers when using their products.71  
The FTC’s present scope of privacy control is limited to enforcement of the 
company’s privacy policies, discussed below. 
C. Food and Drug Administration Regulations 
The Food and Drug Administration (FDA) regulates both in-hospital 
genetic testing and DTC testing when used to provide health information.72  
Both are classified as medical devices and are considered genetic health 
risk (GHR) tests under the regulations.73  Most GHR tests are classified as 
Class III Medical Devices that require pre-market review prior to sale 
because there is no predicate device on the market.74  The FDA in the past 
practiced “enforcement discretion” over the DTC tests, meaning the FDA 
deferred regulation and allowed the tests to be sold without pre-review.75  
The FDA classified GHR tests as low-risk laboratory developed tests.76  In 
2013, after a growing concern over the accuracy of DTC tests, the FDA 
halted the marketing of all DTC tests that provided health information.77  
Later, in 2017, the FDA changed their stance after acknowledging the 
growing popularity and risk of GHR testing.78 
The FDA ensures accuracy and consistency in GHR tests.79  Notably, 
the FDA also requires that the risks of use and the results of these tests, 
when conveying medical information, be presented in a way that 
 
 68  Kayte Spector-Bagdady & Elizabeth Pike, Consuming Genomics: Regulating Direct-
To-Consumer Genetic and Genomic Information, 92 NEB. L. REV. 677, 717 (2014). 
 69  Complaint at 1-2, In re GeneLink, Inc. & Foru Int’l Corp., No. 112-3095 (F.T.C. 
Jan. 7, 2014) (The companies recommended certain dietary supplements based upon genetic 
tests).  
 70  Id.  
 71  Id. 
 72  Spector-Bagdady & Pike, supra note 68, at 686. 
 73  Id. 
 74  Spector-Bagdady & Pike, supra note 68, at 703; Evaluation of Automatic Class III 
Designation (De Novo), FOOD AND DRUG ADM’, 
https://www.fda.gov/medicaldevices/deviceregulationandguidance/howtomarketyourdevice/
premarketsubmissions/ucm462775.htm (last visited Nov. 15. 2019). 
 75  Spector-Bagdady & Pike, supra note 68. 
 76  Spector-Bagdady & Pike, supra note 68. 
 77  Spector-Bagdady & Pike, supra note 68, at 705-6. 
 78  Spector-Bagdady & Pike, supra note 68 (this acknowledgement was part of the 21st 
Century Cures Act). 
 79  Evaluation of Automatic Class III, supra note 74.  
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consumers can understand and use.80  The FDA requires warnings that 
include privacy risks and health results. 
D. Clinical Laboratory Improvement Amendments (CLIA) 
The Clinical Laboratory Improvement Amendments of 1988 
(“CLIA”) were enacted to improve the quality of clinical laboratories.81  
CLIA is administered by the Department of Health and Human Services 
through the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (“CMS”) in 
conjunction with the Food and Drug Administration and the Centers for 
Disease Control.82  Clinical laboratories include those that examine 
“materials derived from the human body to provide information for the 
diagnosis, prevention, or treatment of any disease or impairment of, or the 
assessment of the health of, human beings.”83  CLIA regulates genetic 
testing when genetic analysis is used for health information; both direct-to-
consumer tests like 23andMe84, Helix85 and laboratories used by hospitals86 
must be CLIA certified because they provide health information.87 
Conversely, laboratories like Ancestry.com do not test their samples 
in CLIA certified laboratories because their analysis is used only for 
genealogical analysis, not health information.88  CLIA’s purpose is to 
ensure the quality of laboratories.89  CLIA does not expressly have a direct 
 
 80  Press Release, Food and Drug Administration, FDA Allows Marketing Of First 
Direct-To-Consumer Tests That Provide Genetic Risk Information For Certain Conditions 
(Apr. 6, 2017) (on file at 
https://www.fda.gov/newsevents/newsroom/pressannouncements/ucm551185.htm).  
 81  42 U.S.C.S. § 263(a). 
 82  About CLIA, CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL, https://wwwn.cdc.gov/clia/About.aspx 
(last visited Nov. 15, 2019). 
 83  42 U.S.C.S. §§ 263a (a-b) (explaining that no person may accept and/or examine 
samples from human beings without a CLIA certificate).  
 84  Genetic Science, 23ANDME, https://www.23andme.com/genetic-science/ (last visited 
Nov. 14, 2019). 
 85  HELIX, https://www.helix.com/ (last visited Nov. 14, 2019).  
 86  CLIA Laboratory Certification, INVITAE, https://support.invitae.com/hc/en-
us/articles/115000002427-Is-Invitae-Clinical-Laboratory-Improvement-Amendments-
CLIA-certified (last visited Nov. 14, 2019) (explaining the certifications status of Invitae, a 
laboratory that process samples sent from health care providers); see also CLIA Laboratory 
Certification, AMBRY GENETICS, 
https://www.ambrygen.com/file/material/view/759/CLIA_EXP_5.29.20.pdf (last visited 
Nov. 14, 2019) (demonstrating the certification of Ambry Genetics, a lab that processes 
samples from a health care provider for genetic testing).  
 87  See e.g., HELIX, supra note 85; INVITAE, supra note 86; AMBRY GENETICS, supra note 
86. 
 88  See 42 U.S.C.S. § 263a(a). 
 89  But see Stephany Tandy-Connor et al., False-Positive Results Released By Direct-to-
Consumer Genetic Tests Highlight the Importance of Clinical Confirmation Testing for 
Appropriate Patient Care, NATURE, (Mar. 22, 2018), 
https://www.nature.com/articles/gim201838 (demonstrating that not all results are accurate); 
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impact on an individual’s privacy; however, the operation of the 
regulations may affect individual privacy.90  While CLIA requires 
laboratories to retain data for at least two years, it does not restrict the use 
of stored data. 91  Laboratories operating under the scope of CLIA cannot 
delete consumer or patient information, even upon request of the 
individual.92 
E. The Federal Common Rule 
The Federal Common Rule regulates any institution conducting 
federally-funded research with human subjects.93  Some DTC testing 
companies, like 23andMe, perform this kind of federally-funded research.94  
The Common Rule requires approval by an institutional review board 
(IRB) before beginning most research that involves a human subject.95  Part 
of the IRB requirements include the documentation of the privacy 
standards that will be employed to protect the confidentiality of 
participants.96  As outlined in the regulations, the individual department 
heads provide industry-specific guidance.97  In addition to the requirements 
above, the Common Rule requires that researchers maintain their records 
for at least three years.98 
The Common Rule also sets forth regulations for the standards of 
informed consent for participants in research projects.99  The statement of 
informed consent must include a “concise and focused presentation of the 
key information.”100  Informed consent requires a statement of the purpose, 
risks or discomforts, benefits, alternatives, and confidentiality 
 
see also Phil Rogers et al., DNA Test Says it Will Implement New Controls After NBC 5 
Report, NBC NEWS CHICAGO, May 2, 2018, 4:41 PM, 
https://www.nbcchicago.com/investigations/DNA-Test-Says-itt-Will-Take-Implement-New-
Controls-After-NBC-5-Report-481551691.html (explaining high false-positive rate in direct-
to-consumer genetic testing).  
 90  See Kristen V. Brown, Deleting Your Online DNA Data Is Brutally Difficult, 
BLOOMBERG NEWS, (Jun. 15, 2018, 5:00 PM), 
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-06-15/deleting-your-online-dna-data-is-
brutally-difficult; 42 C.F.R. § 493.1105(a)(6) (2019). 
 91  42 C.F.R. § 493.1105(a)(6). 
 92  See Brown, supra note 90; 42 C.F.R. § 493.1105(a)(6). 
 93  45 C.F.R. § 46.109(a). 
 94  Privacy Policy, 23ANDME, https://www.23andme.com/about/privacy/ (last visited 
Sept. 28, 2019). 
 95  45 C.F.R. § 46.115(a). 
 96  45 C.F.R. § 46.111(a)(7). 
 97  45 C.F.R. § 46.101(a). 
 98  45 C.F.R. § 46.115(b). 
 99  45 C.F.R. § 46.116(b)(1)-(8). 
 100  45 C.F.R. § 46.116(a)(5)(i). 
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protections.101  The disclosure must include a statement that the researchers 
are collecting identifiable information and whether that information will be 
de-identified.102  If the researchers plan to distribute de-identified 
information, for example to a third-party for analysis, the future use of even 
the de-identified material must be included in the informed consent.103  
Similar to HIPAA, the Common Rule exempts de-identified information.104  
Secondary testing of de-identified information may be carried out without 
IRB approval.105 
F. Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act 
The Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act (“GINA”) was 
enacted in 2008 to prevent discrimination based upon genetic 
information.106  While the Act provides some privacy protection, it is 
limited to protection from discrimination in purchasing health insurance 
and employment.107  Because of this limitation,108 the Act does not 
adequately protect consumers of genetic testing services.109  While GINA 
provides some protections, its application is too narrow to ensure the 
privacy of genetic information for most consumers. 
G. State Laws 
Currently, no federal law covers the privacy of genetic information 
disclosed to DTC testing companies; however, many states have enacted 
their own genetic or general privacy laws.110  States have approached 
genetic data protection in different ways.  This section discusses some of 
the most notable approaches. Important questions addressed by these laws 
involve the retention of ownership over genetic data after deposit.  
Specifically, does the individual who submitted the sample or the company 
that analyzed the DNA own the data?  Regardless of the data’s owner, state 
laws recognize that DNA is sensitive information and requires consent 
 
 101  45 C.F.R. § 46.116(b)(1)-(5). 
 102  45 C.F.R. § 46.116(b)(9). 
 103  Id. 
 104  Id. 
 105  See generally, Fed. Policy for the Protection of Human Subjects (‘Common Rule’), 
HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, (last updated Mar. 18, 2016), 
https://www.hhs.gov/ohrp/regulations-and-policy/regulations/common-rule/index.html. 
 106  See generally Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act, 110 P.L. 233, 122 Stat. 
881 (2008).  
 107  Id. 
 108  Id.  
 109  GINA expanded HIPAA protections to include genetic information under the 
definition of patient health information under HIPAA. Id. § 1180(a). 
 110  See e.g., Alaska Stat. §§ 18.13.010–100 (2004). 
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before sharing.  Thus, the key issue of privacy law is consent. 
Alaska’s Genetic Privacy Act focuses on ownership, and states “a 
DNA sample and the results of a DNA analysis performed on the sample 
are the exclusive property of the person sampled or analyzed.”111  This law 
ensures that the individual maintains ownership of their sampled 
information even after the DNA is analyzed.  The Act allows an exception 
for law enforcement or medical necessity.112  Notably, the law requires 
informed and written consent that is specific to the analysis performed.113  
A general release for genetic analysis is insufficient.114 
New York (“NY”) takes a different approach to regulating the genetic 
testing market, especially DTC tests.115  To market or sell DTC tests to 
consumers, the company must first register the product as an over-the-
counter device with the FDA.116  NY Civil Rights Laws also include 
heightened confidentiality requirements.117  Under NY law, genetic testing 
is strictly confined to the tests for which consent was given.118  The NY law 
differs, significantly, from the Alaska law in scope.  NY’s law is applicable 
only when considering genetic testing for the purpose of medical 
diagnostics.119  NY’s laws add heightened confidentiality protections, but 
do not provide the same degree of ownership afforded in Alaska. 
While some states chose to regulate the privacy of genetic 
information, California enacted laws to protect data privacy on a broad 
scale.120  California’s Consumer Privacy Act, effective January of 2020, has 
three primary aims: (1) to give individuals ownership of their data; (2) to 
give individuals control over the information collected from them; and (3) 
to provide increased security for consumers.121  In providing ownership and 
control of data, the law requires disclosures from companies about what 
information is collected122 and also requires that companies delete any data 
 
 111  Alaska Stat. § 18.13.010(a)(2) (2004). 
 112  Alaska Stat. § 18.13.010(b) (2004). 
 113  Alaska Stat. § 18.13.010(c) (2004). 
 114  Id. 
 115  See generally N.Y. C.L.S. Civ. R., Art. 7, § 79-l (2002). 
 116  See Emily Mullin, As Consumer DNA Testing Grows, Two States Resist, MIT TECH. 
REV. (Sept. 28, 2017), https://www.technologyreview.com/s/608958/as-consumer-dna-
testing-grows-two-states-resist/; see also N.Y. C.L.S. Civ. R., Art. 7, § 79-l (2002). 
 117  See generally N.Y. C.L.S. Civ. R., Art. 7, § 79-l (2002). 
 118  Id.  
 119  N.Y. C.L.S. Civ. R., Art. 7, § 79-l(1)(a) (2002); cf. Alaska Stat. §§ 18.13.010-100 
(2004) (where Alaska’s statute applies broadly to include paternity, law enforcement, and 
medicine, New York’s statute is limited to tests performed for medical purposes). 
 120  See About, CA PRIVACY, https://www.caprivacy.org (last visited Nov. 15, 2019).  
 121  Id. 
 122  Cal. Civ. Code § 1798.100 (2018).  
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collected upon consumer request.123  In ensuring the security of 
information, the law adds penalties for companies with data breaches.124  In 
addition, the state has enacted its own expansion of GINA, CalGINA, 
which includes genetic information as a protected class under state laws.125 
IV. PRIVACY POLICIES OF DTC GENETIC TESTING COMPANIES 
The specific policies of each genetic testing company provide the 
most insight into consumer privacy protections.  23andMe’s privacy policy 
outlines how the company ensures the protection of consumer data once the 
company receives it.126  The company explains, “23andMe will not sell, 
lease, or rent your individual-level information to any third party or to a 
third party for research purposes without your explicit consent.”127  Later in 
the privacy policy, individual-level data is defined as information “. . . 
about a single individual’s genotypes, diseases or other traits/
characteristics, but which is not necessarily tied to Registration 
Information.”128  23andMe represents that consumer consent is a 
prerequisite to disclosure of genetic data or personally identifiable 
information to certain parties contained within the privacy statement.129  
The Privacy Policy further states that even if an individual does not consent 
to 23andMe research, “. . . Genetic Information and Self-Reported 
Information may still be used by us and shared with our third party service 
providers.”130  While 23andMe cannot lease, sell, or rent the data to a third-
party without consent, it seems clear that the company reserves the right to 
disclose identifiable information to a third-party service provider for other 
purposes.131  23andMe limits who the company can share information to, 
but the company does not limit what information can be shared under the 
 
 123  Cal. Civ. Code § 1798.105 (2018). 
 124  Cal. Civ. Code § 1798.150-55 (2018). 
 125  Senate Bill No. 559, (Sept. 6, 2011), http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/pub/11-
12/bill/sen/sb_0551-0600/sb_559_bill_20110906_chaptered.pdf. 
 126 Privacy Policy, 23ANDME, (last updated Sept. 30, 2019) 
https://www.23andme.com/about/privacy/. 
 127  Id. 
 128  Id. 
 129  Id. 
 130  See Privacy Policy, supra note 126. Genetic Information is defined as “Information 
regarding your genotype (e.g. the As, Ts, Cs, and Gs at particular locations in your 
genome)” and includes reported results. Self-reported Information is defined as 
“information you provide directly to us, including your disease conditions, other health-
related information, personal traits, ethnicity, family history, and other information that you 
enter into surveys, forms, or features while signed in to your 23andMe account.” 
 131  See Privacy Policy, supra note 126. The 23andMe Privacy Policy uses third party to 
reference companies like Facebook and Twitter, along with laboratories and researchers. 
The privacy policy, however, does not specify the purposes for which the information may 
be used. 
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policy.132 
V. ANALYSIS 
Ensuring genetic privacy is tricky.  The information that a consumer 
provides to a company when choosing genetic testing is unique and 
important.133  The information should be handled with care.  Currently, no 
federal law ensures consumer privacy of this vital genetic information used 
by DTC testing companies, and instead enforcement of privacy is left to the 
FTC.134  The FTC promises to enforce good faith and fair dealing, but their 
power in regulating genetic testing is limited to enforcing the promises 
made in that company’s confusing privacy policy.135  While some states 
took action to ensure consumer privacy through the enactment of genetic 
privacy laws, the lack of uniformity created a patchwork of protection, 
furthering consumer confusion.136  The question of who a consumer can 
trust to hold and analyze their DNA has no simple answer.  This section 
explores some of the shortcomings of the current regulatory framework 
while considering what a consumer’s best option may be for genetic 
privacy.  This section then argues that the current lack of uniformity in 
DNA privacy law leaves consumers vulnerable and seriously compromised 
to receive information through analysis of their DNA. 
A. Looking to Future Regulation: Different classifications, same test? 
Using the purpose of genetic analysis to determine whether a test 
falls under certain regulation leaves consumers vulnerable. 
Genetic testing and genealogy testing are monitored and regulated 
differently; however, the differences should not compromise the 
consumer’s privacy in the process of conducting analysis.  Furthermore, 
these similar testing mechanisms should be regulated similarly for the sake 
of consistency and predictability in regulation.  Although DNA may be 
sequenced in both instances,  companies are not required to comply with 
FDA,137 HHS,138 or CLIA139 regulations of laboratories in genealogy testing 
 
 132  See Privacy Policy, supra note 126. 
 133  Genetics Home Reference, supra note 25.  
 134  About the FTC, supra note 57.  
 135  About the FTC, supra note 57. 
 136  Genetic Discrimination and Other Laws, NAT’L INSTITUTE OF HEALTH, (Apr. 17, 
2017), https://www.genome.gov/27568503/genetic-discrimination-and-other-laws/. 
 137  See generally, Evaluation of Automatic Class III, supra note 74 (A kit used to 
sample saliva for genealogical testing does not require FDA approval as it is not a medical 
device). 
 138  Federal Policy for the Protection of Human Subjects (‘Common Rule’), HEALTH AND 
HUMAN SERVICES, (last updated March 18, 2016) https://www.hhs.gov/ohrp/regulations-
and-policy/regulations/common-rule/index.html (HHS Common Rule does not apply in 
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due to a loophole created by the fact that the companies do not produce 
health information.140  In looking towards a data privacy plan, lawmakers 
should consider whether companies like 23andMe or Ancestry.com can be 
effectively regulated under a broad privacy law, or in the alternative, 
whether DNA data presents a unique problem that will require more 
scrutinized regulation.  If lawmakers choose to regulate the field of genetic 
analysis to improve privacy under a federal law, lawmakers must consider 
several important questions: (1) should consumers be afforded “ownership” 
of their genetic data?; (2) is the distinction between health information and 
genetic ancestral information material?; and (3) will DNA regulation slow 
advancements in health care?  This section will argue that due to the 
identifiable nature and unique quality of familial DNA, regulating this field 
requires more than a federal privacy law. 
1. Data Privacy is Not Sufficient to Protect Consumers of 
Genetic Testing 
When consumers or patients participate in genetic testing, the risk 
associated with allowing a company to digitize their DNA is unclear.141  
When a consumer deposits a DNA sample, the sample is retained for a 
significant period of time.142  Science has yet to fully understand the use 
and importance of retained DNA samples.143  Lawmakers must consider 
whether legislation should aim to ensure consumers own or control their 
DNA, even after analysis is performed.144  This consideration must also 
account for and remain adaptable to scientific advancements of DNA use 
and development. 
One journalist—after comparing multiple DTC companies—felt 
unsettled about how easily and freely her genetic material flowed.145  The 
journalist wrote an article comparing the results of her genetic analysis 
from many of the major DTC and genealogical companies.146  The 
journalist then attempted to delete her data from the companies that she 
 
ancestry DNA testing). 
 139  About CLIA, supra note 82. 
 140  42 U.S.C.S. § 263(a); 21 C.F.R. § 600.3. 
 141  Spector-Bagdady & Pike, supra note 68, at 729.  
 142  See 42 C.F.R. 493.1105(a)(6). 
 143  Carrie Arnold and Mosaic, The Uncertain Future of Genetic Testing, THE ATLANTIC 
(Jul. 19, 2017). 
 144  See generally, Emily Mullin, As Consumer DNA Testing Grows, Two States Resist, 
MIT TECHN. REVIEW, Sept. 28, 2017, https://www.technologyreview.com/s/608958/as-
consumer-dna-testing-grows-two-states-resist./. 
 145  See Brown, supra note 90. 
 146  See Brown, supra note 90. 
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used.147  It became clear to the journalist that deleting DNA from these 
websites is far trickier than she expected.148 In fact, the journalist was 
ultimately unable to remover her data from the website.149 The privacy 
policies are long and confusing, and the companies’ compliance with CLIA 
regulation requires them to retain her DNA sample for at least three 
years.150 
The issue of DNA regulation is unique, because the data itself is 
unique.151  Currently, no federal law provides ownership of data, especially 
not genetic data.  However, in drafting new legislative enactments, 
lawmakers should consider whether the aim is to protect genetic data after 
it is generated or to provide consumers with control over the data.  
Practically, an individual may wish to control their genetic data to ensure 
its safety, to delete their data, or potentially to sell their data to another 
party.  However, companies investing in the development of DNA analysis 
also have interests in aggregating and selling the data.  Data aggregation 
has played a large role in the advancement of genetic analysis and may 
even be critical to further developments.152  The answer is that lawmakers 
should seek a combination of structures: allow consumers additional 
control, ensure safety in data storage, but should not grant complete 
ownership to ensure privacy protections do not hamper further 
developments.  In doing so, lawmakers can ensure they continue 
encouraging technological developments and consumer safety. 
Reaching a uniform method of genetic privacy protection is a timely 
concern. The Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and 
Transportation recently held hearings to address consumer privacy law on a 
federal scale.153  While some states already acted, the resultant patchwork 
protection is ineffective for both consumer protection and company 
efficiency.  In Alaska, lawmakers answered the question of genetic privacy 
by providing ownership of genetic data post-analysis.154  Other states, like 
California, instead focused on data privacy and the right to delete data.155  It 
is likely, if lawmakers use these laws as a model, that a new law would 
 
 147  See Brown, supra note 90. 
 148  See Brown, supra note 90. 
 149  See Brown, supra note 90. 
 150  See Brown, supra note 90. 
 151  See generally, Mullin, supra note 144.  
 152  See generally, Olivier Devuyst, The 1000 Genomes Project: Welcome to a New 
World, J. OF THE INT’L SOCIETY FOR PERITONEAL DIALYSIS (Dec. 2015); see e.g., Aparna 
Vidyasagar, What is CRISPR?, LIVE SCIENCE (Apr. 20, 2018) (Explaining the use and 
advancement of CRISPR-Cas9 technology as a gene-editing tool). 
 153  Policy Principles, supra note 67.  
 154  See e.g., Alaska Stat. § 18.13.010 (2013). 
 155  See About, CA PRIVACY, https://www.caprivacy.org (last visited Sept. 28, 2019). 
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favor data privacy and add a right to delete as well as a heightened 
requirement for informed consent, but not the right to retain ownership, 
because privacy-focused laws are more numerous than ownership-focused 
laws.156  Lawmakers likely would not impose full ownership of data, 
because such regulation may stagnate further development in genetic 
science.  Because the future of DNA research is uncertain and the power of 
DNA has yet to be fully realized, it is imperative that consumers retain an 
ability to delete their DNA. 
The California Consumer Privacy Act focuses on ensuring consumer 
consent to data collection and retention.157  While this is an excellent step 
towards ensuring consumer privacy, in the realm of genetics, consent is not 
sufficient.  Individuals share a significant amount of their DNA with family 
members: siblings, parents, and cousins.158  In the case of the Golden State 
Killer, the suspect did not consent to DNA testing, but his brother’s DNA 
was publicly available on GEDmatch.com, providing an adequate 
identifiable link.159  Consent does not ensure privacy because of the shared 
DNA between family members.  When genetic privacy laws focus on 
consent alone, they overlook the crucial consideration that many 
individuals who do not participate in genetic testing are still affected by 
these laws. Due to the popularity and size of genetic databases, statistically, 
almost every individual has a genetic link in at least one database.160  While 
consent is a step towards greater privacy, the regulation of genetic data is 
sui generis, and regulating DNA requires a fine-tuned approach that 
understands the familial connection. 
Regulating consent in genetic testing is an impractical solution to 
genetic privacy.  By regulating consent, privacy laws do not protect the 
genetic relatives of those offering their consent.  Privacy is always 
important; however, in consideration of genetic privacy, it is even more 
important, because third parties cannot practically offer consent on behalf 
of another.  The Golden State Killer did not consent when his relative used 
an ancestral database; yet, the Golden State Killer was still identified using 
a freely accessible database.161  Like the GDPR, a genetic privacy law 
 
 156  See e.g., Alaska Stat. §18.13.010 (2018). 
 157  Id. 
 158  Average Percent DNA Shared Between Relatives, 23ANDME 
https://customercare.23andme.com/hc/en-us/articles/212170668-Average-percent-DNA-
shared-between-relatives (last visited Sept. 28, 2019).  
 159  Durcharme, supra note 35.  
 160  See District of Columbia Department of Health, supra note 28; see also supra notes 
31-35. 
 161  See Sarah Zhang, How a Tiny Website Became the Police’s Go-To Genealogy 
Database, THE ATLANTIC, June 1, 2018, 
https://www.theatlantic.com/science/archive/2018/06/gedmatch-police-genealogy-
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should aim to keep information private. GDPR focuses on safeguarding the 
information once it is collected,162 but GDPR does not fully account for the 
unique quality of DNA. GDPR and the California Consumer Privacy Act 
provide starting points for drafting new law, but these laws do not fully 
protect consumers, as discussed below. 
2. The Difference Between Health Information and Ancestry 
Analysis is Immaterial and Therefore Both Approaches 
Should be Regulated as Similar Tests 
Presently, regulation distinguishes between genetic analysis aimed at 
providing health information and genetic analysis aimed at providing 
ancestral information.163  This is likely because the health industry is highly 
regulated, and lawmakers have an interest in protecting patients and 
ensuring they receive adequate care.  The risk of providing inaccurate 
information for health risks is much higher than that of ancestry because 
consumers can make medical decisions based upon genetic health risks.164  
Considering the disparity of risk in providing inaccurate information, this 
distinction seems appropriate. Whenever focusing on consumer privacy, 
this distinction makes less sense.  In either event, an individual has enough 
information about their DNA analyzed and digitized to create an 
identifiable data sample.165  For this reason, lawmakers must consider a 
legal approach specific to genetic privacy, not just data privacy. 
To avoid liabilities and regulatory controls, DTC companies can and 
have bifurcated, splitting their companies and services to avoid 
regulation.166  This means that companies might provide either sequencing 
or interpretation of DNA and rely upon a third party for the remaining 
service.167  Other companies may instead require a physician intermediary 
to ensure compliance with testing regulations.168  While companies can 
adapt to new regulations, the fact that genetic data is regulated as either a 
laboratory test or health information means that companies can split their 
 
database/561695. 
 162  See generally, European Union General Data Protection Regulation (EU) 2016/679, 
Art. 1, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:32016R0679&from=en. 
 163  See 42 U.S.C.S. § 263(a) (2019); 21 C.F.R. 600.3 (2019) (Regulations such as FDA 
and CLIA only apply to laboratories that provide health information, not ancestry). 
 164  Bob Curley, Up to 40 Percent of At-Home Genetic Test Results May Be ‘False 
Positives,’ HEALTHLINE, (Apr. 5, 2018), https://www.healthline.com/health-news/40-
percent-at-home-genetic-test-results-false-positives.  
 165  Id. 
 166  Spector-Bagdady & Pike, supra note 68, at 729.  
 167  Spector-Bagdady & Pike, supra note 68, at 730. 
 168  Spector-Bagdady & Pike, supra note 68, at 728. 
SKLAR (DO NOT DELETE) 1/27/2020  12:06 PM 
2020] BE CAREFUL WHERE YOU SPIT 197 
services into two separate companies to avoid regulation and liability.169  
However, if the goal of heightened oversight from the FDA and CLIA in 
DTC health tests is to ensure consumer protection, should those same 
protections not be afforded to consumers of ancestry tests? 
Not only can companies avoid regulations, but consumers may also 
bypass these regulatory safeguards.  Ancestral testing companies, like 
Ancestry.com, allow consumers to obtain their raw DNA data.170  If a test is 
performed only to produce a raw DNA sequence it can avoid compliance 
with FDA and HHS regulations.171  The output information can later be 
utilized to provide health information.172  Under the current regulatory 
framework, the same genetic test is subject to materially different 
regulation depending on the purpose of the test.173 
Lawmakers clearly understood the unique quality of genetic data 
when they enacted GINA.  However, since the enactment of GINA, genetic 
data has become more accessible to consumers.  GINA’s protections must 
be expanded to ensure discrimination does not occur in contexts outside the 
rule’s current scope.  GINA, for example, does not protect from 
discrimination in some insurance contexts such as disability insurance, 
long-term care insurance, or life insurance.174  It may be a necessary 
business policy to exclude individuals with genetic abnormalities from life 
insurance; however, it is unlikely consumers fully understand the 
downstream effects of testing their DNA when they reach for a DTC test.  
If an individual has a genetic condition covered under GINA, that same 
individual is likely in need of additional insurance plans like those listed 
above.  By choosing to use a genetic test, that individual may render 
themselves unqualified for necessary insurance benefits without 
understanding this risk at the time of testing. 
GINA’s current scope is too narrow to protect consumers’s use of 
genetic analysis effectively.  By ensuring protections only in the realm of 
health insurance and employment, lawmakers are effectively masking the 
problem.  GINA has a broad name that seems to offer a promise of wide-
ranging protections, when in reality, the law is extremely limited in scope. 
 
 
 
 169  Spector-Bagdady & Pike, supra note 68, at 728-30. 
 170  Frequently Asked Questions, supra note 21.  
 171  Spector-Bagdady & Pike, supra note 68, at 730. 
 172  Spector-Bagdady & Pike, supra note 68, at 730.  
 173  Spector-Bagdady & Pike, supra note 68, at 730-31. 
 174  Can the results of direct-to-consumer genetic testing affect my ability to get 
insurance?, NAT’L INST. OF HEALTH, 
https://ghr.nlm.nih.gov/primer/dtcgenetictesting/dtcinsurancerisk (last visited Sept. 28, 
2019).  
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If the legislature enacts a new law to protect consumer privacy, the 
most effective regulator is the FTC.  The FTC is presently the only 
regulatory agency with jurisdiction over all types of genetic analysis: health 
care provider, DTC testing, and genealogy.175  Therefore, the FTC is a 
reasonable choice for such regulation.  However, as argued above, it is 
necessary to enact a law specific to the unique problem of genetic testing, 
and if such an approach were taken, the FTC would not be the most 
appropriate regulator of the tests, because the scope of the FTC’s 
regulatory power is too narrow.  Instead, the legislature would need to 
expand the classification of health information to also include genealogy.  
These types of genetic analyses could be effectively regulated under the 
supervision of the FDA as those methods of analyses employ a device that 
is either used to produce health information or has the capacity to produce 
health information. 
3. Regulation Must Encourage Further Advancements in DNA. 
Free information sharing is important to the advancement of DNA 
technology.  When data is shared freely, researchers learn from one another 
and advance more quickly.  Stagnation in research often occurs when 
researchers cannot collaborate. Genetic research is still a growing field.176  
Many questions remain as to what can be learned from and manipulated in 
DNA.177  Much of the existing advancement of genetic research is 
attributable to the free sharing of data.178  While it is important to protect 
consumer privacy, these concerns must be balanced against the utility of 
collaborative science.179 
With this in mind, it is important for lawmakers to consider and 
ensure that privacy protection does not limit the ability of scientists to 
further developments in genetic research.  This problem, however, presents 
a simple solution. As it stands, many genetic databases, regardless if the 
information is collected through a HIPAA protected entity, can be accessed 
by any researcher, regardless of their credentials.180  Individuals should be 
 
 175  See generally About the FTC, supra note 57.  
 176  See Carrie Arnold and Mosaic, The Uncertain Future of Genetic Testing, THE 
ATLANTIC, (July 19, 2019), https://www.theatlantic.com/science/archive/2017/07/the-
uncertain-future-of-genetic-testing/534045/.  
 177  See, e.g., Aparna Vidyasagar, What is CRISPR?, LIVE SCIENCE, (Apr. 20, 2018) 
(explaining the use and advancement of CRISPR-Cas9 technology as a gene-editing tool). 
 178  See generally, Olivier Devuyst, The 1000 Genomes Project: Welcome to a New 
World, JOURNAL OF THE INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY FOR PERITONEAL DIALYSIS (2015).  
 179  Sejin Ahn, Whose Genome Is It Anyway?: Re-identification and Privacy Protection 
in Public and Participatory Genomics, 52 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 751, 802 (2015) (suggesting 
that if DNA databases are permitted to free source genetic information, further protections 
should restrict access).  
 180  See Devuyst, supra note 178.  
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allowed to freely input their own data and retrieve information related to 
their own genetic analysis.  However, privacy should ensure that not every 
researcher or layman can obtain access to listings of inputted genetic data.  
Licensing or training should be necessary to access this information.  DNA 
is unique to an individual and because it can be re-identified, it should be 
handled with care.  Licensing would provide a simple method to ensure 
appropriate safeguards to the development of science, while ensuring 
protection of consumers. 
Presently, the issue of genetic privacy is approached from the wrong 
angle.  DTC health testing will likely continue to appeal to the market as an 
easily accessible tool to learn about potential health risk.181 The only way to 
ensure that consumers receive the same level of protection as in-hospital 
testing is to regulate it under a genetic privacy law. 
B. Where should you send your spit? 
With the regulatory framework explained above in mind, the question 
remains: when an individual look to analyze their DNA, which type of 
service will provide the greatest protection to their privacy?  The following 
section will explore the privacy benefits and pitfalls of the four main 
frameworks: (1) in-hospital testing; (2) DTC genetic health testing; (3) 
DTC ancestry testing; and, (4) ancestral databases.  The following will not 
consider the accuracy of genetic testing or other cost/benefits, but the 
privacy protections afforded by the different services. 
1. In-Hospital Genetic Testing is Not as Safe as it Seems. 
In-hospital genetic testing may offer greater accuracy, but privacy 
protections for these types of tests are lacking.182  A consumer may think 
that this avenue would provide them with the greatest privacy, but that may 
not be the case.  When a doctor orders genetic testing at a hospital, an 
individual is protected by the Privacy Rule of the Health Insurance 
Portability and Accountability Act.183 While HIPAA protects individual 
privacy, it allows for the sharing of patient health information once the 
information is deemed de-identified.184  It is important to note that 
“information inherent in DNA can be retrieved by relatively simple 
 
 181  See Steven Salzberg, NY Times, Why Are You So Worried About 23andMe’s Genetic 
Tests, FORBES, Feb. 4, 2019; see also Editorial Board, Why You Should Be Careful About 
23andMe’s Health Test, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 1, 2019; Anne Wojcicki, 23andMe Responds: 
Empowering Consumers, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 5, 2019.  
 182  How can consumers be sure a genetic test is valid and useful?, NAT’L INST. OF 
HEALTH, https://ghr.nlm.nih.gov/primer/testing/validtest (last visited Nov. 15, 2019). 
 183  Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA), supra note 40.  
 184  Ahn, supra note 179, at 772-775. 
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processing,” meaning that DNA can be re-identified.185  HIPAA protection 
does not account for the re-identifiable nature of DNA.186 
Not only does HIPAA allow the free sharing of “de-identified” patient 
information, but many databases exist that allow public access to genetic 
databases for genetic research.  These include laboratory databases, the 
NIH database, and open source databases from data sharing campaigns.187  
“Free the Data!” is a grassroots movement to share sequenced data to 
advance genetic technologies.188  Laboratories and hospitals that sequence 
and analyze patient genetic samples participate in grassroots data sharing 
campaigns.189  Patient information, once analyzed and stripped of 
identifiers, is entered into free databases.190 Database sharing exists for 
practical reasons.191  Through the open sharing of data, hospitals can more 
accurately and efficiently diagnose and treat illnesses; thus, medical 
advancements come with a trade-off. 192  Medical information may be less 
protected, yet medical treatment may improve.193  Researchers have, in fact, 
re-identified genetic information retrieved from a grassroots database.194  
The individual participated in a clinical trial, in which their data was 
entered into an open database.195  Although that database did not include 
“identifiable information,” researchers used a combination of open-source 
ancestry databases and public genealogy databases to re-identify the 
genetic sample.196 
Patients that receive genetic analysis in hospitals will also have added 
protections of CLIA and HHS Common Rule if they participate in research, 
but as explained above these regulations do not provide privacy 
protection.197  While in-hospital tests provide the additional benefit of 
heightened accuracy and a professional’s opinion, privacy is not 
necessarily any greater.  In this context, HIPAA is a false promise. 
 
 185  Ahn, supra note 179, at 768; see also Elrich supra note 32 at 2.  
 186  Ahn, supra note 178 at 768-69. 
 187  Privacy Practices, INVIATE, (last visited Nov. 14, 2019) 
https://invitae.com/en/privacy/.  
 188  Katherine Lamberston & Sharon F. Terry, Free the Data!, 18 Genetics Testing and 
Molecular Biomarkers, 1 (Jan 1, 2014). 
 189  Id.; Collaborations, AMBRY GENETICS, 
https://www.ambrygen.com/research/collaborations (last visited Sept. 28, 2018).  
 190  Lamberston et al., supra note 188.  
 191  Lawrence O. Gostin, Health Information Privacy, 80 CORNELL L. REV. 451, 455 
(1995).  
 192  Id. at 476-77. 
 193  Id. 
 194  Elrich, supra note 32.  
 195  Elrich, supra note 32. 
 196  Elrich, supra note 32. 
 197  See supra notes 81-92, 93-105. 
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2. DTC Genetic Testing: The Greater the Market Pressure, the 
Greater the Privacy 
DTC companies like 23andMe and Helix are required to comply with 
Common Rule and CLIA regulations when conducting federally-funded 
research.198  These requirements are also applicable to in-hospital testing 
and require the retention of testing information.199  CLIA regulations 
require that laboratories conducting health information testing retain a 
certain level of data for each individual and test.200  This includes the 
retention of patient information and the types of testing ordered for at least 
two years.201  CLIA, however, imposes higher retention standards for test 
reports.202  For example, pathology tests are required to be retained for ten 
years.203  This means that genetic testing data must be retained by 
companies performing the testing to comply with CLIA.  Consumers of 
both in-hospital testing and DTC testing do not have a right to delete their 
data.204 
Consumers may be under the impression that they can delete their 
data.205  However, consumers of products like 23andMe can only delete 
their individual-level information to an extent.206  An individual can delete 
their account on the website and request their physical samples (deposited 
saliva) to be discarded, but cannot delete their genetic information or 
personal identifiers during a period required by CLIA and the contract for 
services.207  While consumers may benefit from CLIA, because the 
regulations work to ensure accuracy in testing, the alternative consideration 
is that an individual loses the right to delete their data when sending their 
sample to a CLIA certified laboratory.208 
Most privacy protections for DTC test consumers stem from the FTC 
assuring that companies are held to their promises.209  The FTC can ensure 
that any representations in the companies’s privacy policy are enforced.210  
Therefore, the privacy protections found in DTC testing stem only from the 
 
 198  42 U.S.C.S. § 263(a) (2019). 
 199  42 C.F.R. 493.1105(a)(6) (2019). 
 200  42 C.F.R. 493.1105. 
 201  42 C.F.R. 493.1105(a)(1)-(5). 
 202  42 C.F.R. 493.1105(a)(6). 
 203  Id.  
 204  See id.; see also Brown, supra 90.  
 205  Id.  
 206  Privacy and Data Protection, 23ANDME, https://www.23andme.com/about/privacy/ 
(last visited Nov. 15, 2019). 
 207  Id.  
 208  Id.  
 209  About the FTC, supra note 57. 
 210  About the FTC, supra note 57. 
SKLAR (DO NOT DELETE) 1/27/2020  12:06 PM 
202 SETON HALL LEGISLATIVE JOURNAL [Vol. 44:1 
privacy policy represented in the contract for services.  These privacy 
policies are non-negotiable and often overly complicated.  Consumers have 
only one option to protect their privacy: an adhesion contract.  This is an 
unfortunately unsatisfying answer when considering data as unique as 
DNA. 
There are various models amongst DTC testing companies that 
depend partially upon the companies’ resources.  For example, 23andMe is 
considered one of the largest databases.211  Other companies, with smaller 
pools of genetic information, may need to participate in data-sharing to a 
larger extent than 23andMe. The privacy policy, however, on 23andMe’s 
website reserves the company’s right to share consumers’ genetic 
information and even individual level information with third party service 
providers in limited circumstances.212  Data sharing exists in both in-
hospital genetic testing and DTC tests like 23andMe, but the exposure of 
personal, identifiable health information may be greater in DTC tests, 
dependent on the size of the company.213 
The fact that 23andMe owns a large private database creates a 
significant protection for consumer privacy.  For example, as a result of 
their success, 23andMe has few incentives to allow other individuals or 
companies to access their databases.  These market pressures caused DTC 
companies to increase privacy; however, these market pressures and FTC 
regulations remain the main incentives to protect the genetic information of 
their customers.  While individuals are afforded privacy protection when 
they contract for the services of DTC tests, individuals deserve greater 
protection than the choice between adhesion contracts of different DTC 
companies.  Because consumers are providing such important information, 
consumers should have an opportunity to materially bargain or should be 
afforded greater protection. 
3. DTC Genealogy Testing Provides Little to No Privacy 
Protection 
Services like Ancestry provide genetic analyses that do not provide 
health information.214  These services instead analyze DNA and input the 
DNA into a database to find relatives or assess regional ethnicity.215  
 
 211  Henri-Corto Stoeklé et al., 23andMe: a new two-sided data-banking market model, 
BMC MEDICAL ETHICS, 2006, at 4; see also Ducharme, supra note 35 (explaining that 
23andMe has over five million users). 
 212  Law Enforcement Report, ANCESTRY.COM, 
https://www.ancestry.com/cs/legal/privacystatement (last visited Nov. 15, 2019). 
 213  Id.  
 214  Geographical DNA Tests, ANCESTRY.COM, https://www.ancestry.com/dna/ (last 
visited Nov. 15, 2019). 
 215  Id.  
SKLAR (DO NOT DELETE) 1/27/2020  12:06 PM 
2020] BE CAREFUL WHERE YOU SPIT 203 
Because Ancestry does not provide health information or receive federal 
funding, it is not necessary for Ancestry to comply with CLIA, Common 
Rule, or FDA regulations.  These three requirements apply to data utilized 
for health information. Since these tests are not required to comply with 
these regulations, there is no data retention requirement for genealogy 
testing companies.216  Thus, if a consumer chooses genealogy testing over 
health information, the consumer retains an option to delete their data. 
Ancestry’s privacy policy states that they will delete “all genetic 
information” within 30 days of a deletion request.217  This additional ability 
to delete information mimics a progressive understanding of data 
ownership. 
A comparison of DTC genealogy testing and DTC genetic testing is 
not a comparison of like outputs.  One test provides health information and 
the other settles curiosities of family origin.  Both tests begin with the same 
process: the analysis of DNA; however, one test is held to higher standards 
than the other.  These tests are under-regulated for DNA privacy. In theory, 
an individual could sequence their DNA through an ancestry website and 
later use that same sequence to receive health information.  Genealogy 
testing could allow a consumer to bypass any regulatory pathways already 
in place. 
Ancestry must comply with valid requests from law enforcement to 
release personal information about their clients.218  Ancestry provides the 
most clarity and transparency regarding which information and the 
frequency in which the company must share information with law 
enforcement.  In addition, Ancestry publishes yearly reports that allow 
consumers to understand the frequency with which Ancestry releases 
information.219  Not all requests necessarily involve the disclosure of 
genetic material or codes, but such an avenue exists if a valid request is 
submitted.220 
Genealogy testing companies also must comply with FTC guidelines 
as DTC genetic testing companies do.221  It is important to note that while 
the FTC does not provide failsafe protections for the consumer of genetic 
testing, it is the single federal regulatory agency with privacy jurisdiction 
over both DTC health and genealogy testing.  The FTC regulation is 
 
216  Law Enforcement Report, ANCESTRY.COM, 
https://www.ancestry.com/cs/legal/privacystatement (last visited Nov. 15, 2019). 
 217  Id.  
 218  Id.  
 219  Transparency Report, ANCESTRY.COM, https://www.ancestry.com/cs/transparency 
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imperfect because it does not provide privacy protection per se; instead, it 
only enforces what has been promised by the company.  The FTC will 
likely have the power to administer any federal privacy law that may come 
to fruition in the future.222  Arguably, because DTC genealogy and health 
testing utilize the same sensitive re-identifiable information, the two 
services should be regulated under like pathways.  A privacy law would not 
be effective if a such a bypass remains. 
4. Publicly Accessible Genetic Databases Bypass Current 
Privacy Protections 
It is worth considering a final type of consumer tool used in the 
analysis of DNA.  Websites like GEDmatch.com allow consumers to 
upload already digitized DNA data.223  GEDmatch.com recently came into 
the spotlight as the genetic database that led to the capture of the Golden 
State Killer.224  The website allows individuals to upload their genetic data 
digitized from companies like Ancestry.com and share it through a free 
database to find relatives that may use another website.225  GEDmatch.com 
offers the least privacy protections of any above groups, because testing 
was not performed on human samples but already digitized information. 
Websites like GEDmatch.com allow individuals to quickly access vast 
amounts of data.226  Their privacy policy boasts that the company takes care 
in striking the right balance between individual privacy and access to 
information.227  While this application is especially helpful to individuals 
looking for long-lost relatives, DNA test consumers may be uploading 
highly sensitive information without fully understanding the significant 
risks.  GEDmatch.com’s greatest shortcoming is the accessibility of the 
database.  Because the data is so freely available to anyone who wishes to 
find a relative, the privacy of an individual is minimal. However, an 
individual gives informed consent to this minimal privacy.228 
5. Where Should you Spit? 
There is no simple answer when considering where a consumer’s data 
is most protected from the threat of privacy invasion.  Practically, a 
consumer would choose to narrow the type of testing based on the accuracy 
 
 222  See Press Release, supra note 58. 
 223  Durcharme, supra note 35. 
 224  Id.  
 225  Privacy Policy, GEDMATCH.COM, https://www.gedmatch.com/tos.htm (last visited 
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they require in output.  Various studies questioned the accuracy of DTC 
testing, which in part prompted increased regulation from the FDA.229  If an 
individual is interested in learning about their risk of disease, they should 
undoubtedly approach a healthcare professional.  If a consumer is 
concerned only with a curiosity to unlock their genetic building blocks, the 
consumer must consider their privacy. 
In a hospital setting, genetic data can be inputted into a publicly 
accessible database like the 1000 Genomes Project or “Free the Data!”  In 
hospital and DTC health tests alike, consumers and patients do not have a 
right to delete their data. Ancestry tests, however, leave consumers only 
with the protections of the FTC and the contract entered into with the 
testing company.  An open database leaves consumer with the least 
protection.  Consumers must better inform themselves of the risk of 
inputting their genetic information into a database, such as 
GEDmatch.com.  From this analysis, it is evident that privacy is lacking; 
whether legal protections take the form of federal or state laws, more is 
required to protect consumers. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
When lawmakers consider genetic privacy laws, they must consider 
them as such: issues of genetic privacy.  The rapid growth and expansion of 
genetic analysis and the popularity of genetic testing amongst consumers 
have left consumers unprotected.  Because this field continues to grow and 
develop, the laws must be adaptable, forward-looking, and specific to 
genetics. Consumers of either DTC or in-hospital testing either for genetic 
health analysis or genealogy must face serious compromise to receive the 
information held in their DNA.  However, if one wants to test their DNA, 
where they should spit?  The unfortunate and easiest answer is that you 
should not.  Current privacy protection is a misnomer; it does not protect 
consumers.  Future privacy regulation should specifically tackle the issues 
of genetic privacy.  Finally, these issues should balance the free flow of 
data that allows for the development of genetic science with the rights of 
consumers to have their privacy protected. 
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